The floods that ravaged Nepal in August 2026 were more than a natural disaster – they were a preventable tragedy, a stark indictment of how fragile progress becomes when warnings are ignored and resilience is neglected. A glacier collapse on Langtang Lirung unleashed torrents that swept away entire communities, leaving over a thousand dead and thousands missing. Children were cut off from schools, families from healthcare and villages from the outside world as bridges and roads were washed away. The human toll was immense, but what deepens the sorrow is the knowledge that the signs of instability in the Himalayan terrain had long been visible, yet little was done to prepare for disaster of this magnitude. The economic wreckage mirrored the human loss. Hydropower projects, once celebrated as engines of growth, were crippled in a matter of hours. Trade and tourism sector collapsed with the destruction of the Gyirong border crossing, severing a vital artery of commerce. For a nation already struggling with slowing growth, the floods exposed how vulnerable development remains when resilience is not built into its foundations. This was not Nepal’s tragedy alone. Floodwaters and debris crossed borders once again reminding South Asia that climate-driven disasters are shared threats for humanity. Relief efforts, though swift, were overwhelmed and the gap between need and capacity was simply glaring. The lesson is clear: this was not fate, but failure – failure to heed warnings, to invest in preparedness, and to recognize the urgency of climate adaptation. Nepal’s resilience will shape its recovery, but the responsibility to learn the lessons lies with the region as a whole. Stronger governance, resilient infrastructure, and regional cooperation are no longer optional – they are urgent imperatives. The floods must be remembered not only for the lives lost but as an urgent call to action, a reminder that tragedies of this scale are preventable if foresight replaces complacency. The trauma associated with tragedy is unlikely to be forgotten any time soon.
Subhash Chandra, the Founder of Zee and the Essel Group, has long been celebrated as a media pioneer. Yet his recent entanglements reveal a troubling pattern of promoter-centric decision-making that undermines the very principles of corporate governance. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) barred him and ZEEL CEO Punit Goenka from the securities market for a year after finding that prime Hyderabad land owned by Zee Entertainment was pledged without Board approval to secure loans for promoter-linked entities. This unauthorised encumbrance, concealed from shareholders and the audit committee violated fiduciary duties and the SEBI Act amounting to a fraudulent device that prejudiced investor interests. Simultaneously with this development Chandra’s personal insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had already raised eyebrows. Against admitted claims of over ₹22,000 crore – arising largely from personal guarantees he extended to Essel Group loans – his repayment plan offered just ₹6.25 crore to creditors, a recovery rate of barely 0.03%. Critics argue that this highlights the fragility of India’s insolvency framework where personal guarantees blur the line between limited liability and promoter accountability. From a governance perspective, the shenanigans lie in the misuse of listed company assets to cover private debts, lack of disclosures and reliance on personal guarantees to prop up over-leveraged ventures. In one sense, the case exposes glaring gaps in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) when it comes to promoter guarantees and creditor safeguards. The NCLT’s split verdict and subsequent escalation to a five-member bench underscore the institutional strain caused by such high-stakes disputes. The broader lesson is clear: India’s corporate governance mechanism cannot afford unhindered promoter dominance unchecked by Board oversight or fundamental regulatory discipline. Chandra’s manoeuvres – whether pledging assets without sanction or offering token settlements against colossal liabilities illustrate how promoter opportunism can erode trust in capital markets. Regulators, creditors and Boards must insist on transparency, enforce fiduciary standards and treat personal guarantees not as symbolic gestures but as enforceable commitments. Subhash Chandra’s controversies epitomise the collision of weak corporate governance with India’s evolving legal framework – unauthorised pledging of listed company assets, opaque personal guarantees, and insolvency manoeuvres that eventually leave creditors with negligible recovery avenues. His case is now has become a touchstone for how Regulators and Tribunals must enforce fiduciary responsibility and protect shareholder interests. In short, Subhash Chandra’s saga is less about one man’s fall and more about the systemic need to reassert accountability in India’s corporate governance architecture. It is a cautionary tale – when promoters treat listed companies as personal fiefdoms, both investors and institutions end up paying the price. I wonder if Donald Trump, the Emperor of the United States of America watching on TV what is unfolding in Nepal? Having denounced persistently the concept or reality of global warming as a hoax, what has he to tell the world about this Nepalese tragedy?
The United States’ pursuit of Venezuelan oil rights is more than an energy transaction – it is a geopolitical drama that revives old anxieties about ‘the empire’. Officially, Washington has framed the arrangement as pragmatic, if not altruistic – stabilising Venezuela’s economy while securing reliable supplies in a turbulent global market. Yet beneath the veneer of this partnership lies a familiar asymmetry of raw power. The critical fault line is agency. Venezuela negotiates under the weight of sanctions and diplomatic isolation, conditions that blur the line between consent and coercion. When a nation’s economic survival hinges on external approvals, “agreements” risk becoming instruments of dependency rather than sovereignty. This dynamic has colonial precedents – resource‑rich states supplying raw materials while external powers dictate the terms of exchange. Unlike classical colonisation, there is no territorial conquest here. Instead, the U.S. leverages contracts, sanctions relief, and geopolitical pressures to secure influence – an economic colonisation that extracts value without assuming the burdens of direct rule. Sovereignty remains intact on paper but materially compromised in practice. The long‑term trajectory will determine whether this is cooperation or colonisation. If Venezuela channels oil revenues into domestic development and diversifies its economy, the deal may evolve into a pragmatic partnership. If not, it risks perpetuating the colonial script – extraction without empowerment and sovereignty without substance. In essence, the debate is not about oil alone but about who controls the narrative of development – Venezuela as a sovereign actor, the United States as a hegemon cloaked in a partnership. The answer will shape whether this moment is remembered as a lifeline for Venezuela or as the latest chapter in the art of subtle empire building by the United States.
On 31st of August the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation put out India’s real GDP growth for Q1 FY27 (April–June 2026) at 7.8%, up from 6.9% a year earlier – a headline beating estimates of leading economists. The real GDP reached ₹81.36 lakh crore and the nominal GDP rose by 10.30% to ₹88.27 lakh crore. Real GVA grew by 8.20%. The government has understandably showcased this as proof of resilience against external shocks. However, a controversy soon arose. The controversy centres on comparability of the figures with different quarters, not the headline number by itself. The dispute traces to Q1 FY26’s nominal GDP being revised from ₹86.05 lakh crore (old 2011-12 series) down to ₹80 lakh crore (new 2022-23 series) – a roughly ₹6 lakh crore gap. Critics, most prominently former Finance Secretary Subhash Chandra Garg, calculated growth by directly comparing this year’s nominal figure against last year’s old-series figures, arriving at just 2.6% growth of GDP instead of 7.8%. MoSPI’s rebuttal is essentially a methodological one: it says that the ₹86.05 lakh crore old-series estimate cannot be directly compared to the new 2022-23 series figure, and that the revision reflects updated base year, data sources and methodology rather than a deliberate downward adjustment designed to flatter this year’s growth. Government sources add that the new series changed sectoral weights, coverage, estimation procedures and price treatment. Int the process the government took the stand that old-series and new-series numbers are simply apples and oranges. The State Bank of India’s research arm has weighed in on the government’s side but with an important nuance. It called the controversy “unnecessary” and rooted in incorrect interpretations while noting that comparing the new year figure against the new-base equivalent for last year (₹88.3 lakh crore over ₹80.4 lakh crore) yields 9.7% nominal growth rather than the officially released 10.3%. Translating that into real terms, SBI estimates Q1 FY27 real growth would come to about 7.4% rather than 7.8%. Though it still is a strong number, but a meaningful haircut from the headline. SBI also pushed back on claims that the revised inflated GDP, pointing out that it actually reduced the nominal base. They note that GDP revisions have historically moved both up and down – 25 upward and 12 downward revisions on the old base between FY22 and FY25. My reading is that the “2.6% vs 7.8%” framing of the issue is the least defensible part of the debate – mixing two different statistical series to generate a shock number is a well-known way to manufacture a misleading headline and MoSPI’s objection to that specific comparison appears technically sound. But the more serious, harder-to-dismiss critique is SBI’s own reconciliation, which – using apples-to-apples new-series figures – still lands meaningfully below 7.8% (around 7.4%). That suggests part of the beat may be an artifact of base-year and deflator changes rather than pure underlying momentum, even if the government’s core defense against the “2.6%” claim is correct. One has to keep two structural points – first, quarterly GDP estimates are provisional and would not be finalised for roughly 30 months or so. Today’s 7.8% is itself subject to revision. Second, a base-year change of this magnitude arriving right alongside a strong headline number was always going to invite close scrutiny. It is even then less a scandalous than a predictable consequence of overhauling the series. The optics however, understandably fuel suspicion, given the political stakes around growth narratives in the country. The cardinal lesson is that GDP growth cannot be celebrated as a mere statistical triumph. It must be read as a call to action – an opportunity to strengthen resilience, broaden the base of growth, and ensure that prosperity is not confined to urban centres or cyclical rebounds. India’s economy has shown it can sprint; the challenge now is to build the endurance for a marathon. All said and done the economy has proven once again capable of defying global turbulence. However, sustaining this trajectory requires deeper reforms in agriculture, infrastructure and investment climate. For businesses, the message is equally clear. India remains one of the fastest-growing major economies, but sectoral imbalances and uneven demand patterns demand caution. One way of resolving the problem of acceptance of published data is to publish both sets of data to facilitate comparison and in a highly polarised world that we live in.
In mid-2026 the Reserve Bank of India had opened special windows to encourage foreign currency inflows like concessional USD – INR swap facility for banks mobilising FCNR(B) deposits from NRIs and separate windows for External Commercial Borrowings and Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings by public sector entities. As it turned out, these Schemes drew far more money than expected. Banks swapped most of these dollars with RBI for rupees, directly injecting rupee liquidity into the system. As a result, system liquidity surplus jumped to a record ₹9.70 Trillion, higher than post Covid peak. This is essentially a problem of plenty – too much money chasing too few short term assets in the interbank market. Simply put, this excess liquidity complicates financial stability. It pushes overnight call and repo-linked rates toward the lower end of RBI’s rate corridor, more than intended. Falling short-term yields conflict with inflation control if inflation is firm when RBI is considering tighter policy or holding rates higher. Moreover, large, volatile foreign-currency inflows can also create future reversal risk and balance of payments volatility if global conditions shift. Excess liquidity thus became a problem than a matter of comfort. While high forex reserves look strong, the speed and structure of these inflows, mostly debt-like, swap-driven, and concentrated in a short window create operational and policy strain. RBI’s task is to “sterilise” the rupee impact of dollar inflows without disrupting credit growth or market functioning. RBI’s arsenal include:
- Through Liquidity Absorption: Large Variable Rate Reverse Repo auctions to drain surplus liquidity. It can temporarily raise CRR that would force banks to park more funds as idle balances with RBI, directly mopping up liquidity. RBI can sell government bonds from its portfolio to absorb rupees from the market. It can issue securities under a Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) specifically to soak up excess liquidity, with proceeds held in a separate account.
- Managing Closely Forex Trade: Allowing some rupee appreciation or buying fewer dollars in the spot market can reduce the pace of reserve accumulation, though RBI must balance this against export competitiveness and volatility. RBI already ended the special FCNR(B) swap window on 31 August 2026 (earlier than some had expected), signalling a shift from “mobilise at any cost” to “manage the surplus”. Over time, easing norms for Indian entities to invest abroad or prepay external debt can help recycle dollars outwards, reducing one-sided accumulation.
- Structural Considerations: RBI can use part of the reserve buffer for strategic imports, commodity hedging or sovereign wealth type vehicles to reduce the “idle stock” problem though this is more a medium-term policy choice. If government borrowing and spending patterns can be aligned to absorb some of the liquidity (e.g., timing of bond issuance, disbursements), it eases RBI’s burden.
In short, the “problem of plenty” of Dollars arises because RBI successfully attracted a large, concentrated wave of dollar inflows via special schemes, which then turned into an oversized rupee liquidity surplus. The solution mix is likely to be aggressive use of VRRR/OMO/MSS/CRR to drain liquidity, careful FX management to avoid excessive reserve build-up and gradual structural steps to allow two-way capital flows.
Thank you.
Venkat R Venkitachalam
